Showing posts with label passwords. Show all posts
Showing posts with label passwords. Show all posts

Thursday, July 12, 2012

Should you really change your re-used passwords after a breach? Maybe not.

DiceThe news is reporting that 453,000 credentials were allegedly taken from Yahoo, and current reports say that it's probably Yahoo Voice that was compromised. If you want to know if yours is in there, it seems like the hacker website is overwhelmed at the moment, but you can search for your username/email here on a sanitized list that doesn't include the passwords.

Probably unsurprisingly, the next bit of news is that people haven't changed their hacked passwords from previous breaches. To whit, 59% of people were re-using the passwords that had previously been hacked and released to the public in the Sony breach. Which seems a bit high given the publicity, but I'm not as surprised as I maybe should be.

What I'd really like to know is how many of those people actually suffered from this password re-use. Did anyone bother to try re-using their credentials?

I'm reminded of one of my favourite security papers, "So Long, and No Thanks for the Externalities: the Rational Rejection of Security Advice by Users," by Cormac Herley. In it, he claims that many security "best" practices like changing passwords frequently are actually a waste of time for the average user, when you take into account the risks involved.

So, is changing a password after a breach one of those things that we can skip without much incident? Sadly, I don't have any definitive way to analyze how many folk were inconvenienced by their password reuse in the Sony and subsequent Yahoo breaches, but I can make a guess: If those accounts were compromised on Yahoo after the Sony breach, we'd be seeing a lot more people changing their passwords between the two. So probably at least those 59% were not inconvenienced enough to change their passwords subsequent to the breach.  That's a lot of people.

Of course, it's possible that the accounts were breached and used in a way that the owner never noticed. But if they're not noticing, are they really being inconvenienced? Probably in a global sense (i.e. spam) but maybe not in a short-term decision-making sense. Of course, we could assume that the alleged hack is a hoax using many of the previously hacked passwords from Sony, but given how easy it is to compromise web apps I'm currently assuming that the hack itself is a real thing.  In which case, that's a lot of no-change. It looks suspiciously like you're likely to be more inconvenienced taking the time to change your password than you would if you did nothing, statistically speaking.


So, should you change your password after a breach? It depends on how much you feel like rolling the dice. Failing to change their breached passwords doesn't seem to have hurt that many of the Yahoo Voice denizens, but with numbers on re-used passwords hitting the news today, it's possible we'll see more people trying this avenue of attack in the future.  Still, rather than assuming those 59% are foolish for keeping the same credentials, it's worth considering that they might have just been savvy gamblers, this time.

Monday, October 11, 2010

Does expiring passwords really help security?


Change is Easy
Originally uploaded by dawn_perry
I've heard a lot of arguments as to why expiring passwords likely won't help. Here's a few:

  • It's easy to install malware on a machine, so the new password will be sniffed just like the old.
  • It costs more: frequent password changes result in more forgotten passwords and support desk calls.
  • It irritates users, who will then feel less motivated to implement to other security measures.
  • Constantly forcing people to think of new, memorable passwords leads to cognitive shortcuts like password-Sep, password-Oct, password-Nov...
And yet, many organizations continue to force regular password changes in order to improve security. But what if that's not what's really happening? Three researchers from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill have unveiled what they claim to be the first large-scale study on password expiration, and they found it wanting.

They focus especially on the idea that consecutive passwords will be related, and build a system which could try a variety of transforms such as changing which letter was uppercase, duplicating letters/numbers/symbols, and even "leet" translation (eg: raven becomes r@v3n). The implications of their results are fairly clear and potentially disturbing for those who thought password changing was providing extra security in the case of a breach:

  • With offline attacks: "On average, roughly 41% of passwords can be broken from an old password in under 3 seconds."
  • With online attacks: "An average of 13% of accounts can be broken (with cer- tainty) in 5 online guesses, and 18% can be broken in 10 guesses."
  • "As we expand our consideration to other types of transform trees, we would not be surprised to see these success rates jump significantly."
In essence, they've shown that changing passwords doesn't provide nearly as much security as system designers had hoped, and they suggest we abandon the practice rather than continue to annoy users with a policy that has been proven ineffective.

Monday, February 8, 2010

Amex thinks shorter passwords without special characters are more secure

I was working on a background section of my thesis proposal and was talking about how some misconceptions regarding security policies can result in web sites being a lot less secure. But American Express takes security misconceptions to a new low:

I would like to inform you that our website has a 128 bit encryption. With this base, passwords that comprise only of letters and alphabets create an algorithm that is difficult to crack. We discourage the use of special characters because hacking softwares can recognize them very easily.


And it gets worse!

The length of the password is limited to 8 characters to reduce keyboard contact. Some softwares can decipher a password based on the information of “most common keys pressed”.

Therefore, lesser keys punched in a given frame of time lessen the possibility of the password being cracked.


Uh, no guys. Just no.

Also, the former magazine editor in me is going, "softwares? softwares?!" but that's another problem entirely.

Read the rest of what American Express said and see the screenshot here.